



Homeland Security

May 31, 2019

SENT BY ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: foia@americanoversight.org

Clay M. Goode
Austin R. Evers
Katherine Anthony
American Oversight
1030 15th Street NW, Suite B255
Washington, DC 20005

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request 2019-IAFO-00055

Dear Mr. Goode:

This is the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) dated November 15, 2018 and received on February 4, 2019. I&A FOIA has determined that you are requesting the following records:

1. Records sufficient to show the number of intelligence analysts within the Office of Intelligence & Analysis assigned to working on non-Islamist domestic terrorism threats, including right-wing extremism (including, but not limited to, threats or attacks motivated by white supremacist or antigovernment ideology), since January 20, 2009.
2. Any decision memoranda, guidance, or other written communications, regarding any change to the number of intelligence analysts within the Office of Intelligence & Analysis assigned to working the above element since January 20, 2017.
3. Records describing the processing of this request, including records sufficient to identify search terms used and locations and custodians searched and any tracking sheets used to track the processing of this request. If the Office of Intelligence & Analysis uses FOIA questionnaires or certifications completed by individual custodians or components to determine whether they possess responsive materials or to describe how they conducted searches, we also request any such records prepared in connection with the processing of this request.

In regards to your three above elements, I&A FOIA made the determination to conduct the following search:

- 1 &2. The numbers of I&A personnel who worked on non-Islamist domestic terrorism threats, including right-wing extremism in 2009 and 2017.
3. Records produced that contained the search terms you provided, “ideology” “white supremacist” and “Islam...”

The result is a collaboration of thirteen analysis worked on domestic terrorism threats.

After considering the nature of your request, I&A has determined that the fact of the existence or nonexistence of records pertaining to your request would be exempted from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemptions 3 and 7(E). Your request is denied under exemption 3 pursuant to Title 50 US Code § 3024(i) and 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11), which protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Additionally, we are neither confirming nor denying the existence of records under exemption 7(E) as disclosure of the information you requested would reveal law enforcement techniques or procedures and the circumstances under which those procedures or techniques were used. Also, these records are exempted pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). I&A hereby neither confirms nor denies that such records may or may not exist.

You have a right to appeal the above withholding determination. Should you wish to do so, you must send your appeal and a copy of this letter, within 90 days of the date of this letter, to: Privacy Office, Attn: FOIA Appeals, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, SW, Mail Stop 0655, Washington, D.C. 20528-0655, following the procedures outlined in the DHS FOIA regulations at 6 C.F.R. Part 5 § 5.8. Your envelope and letter should be marked "FOIA Appeal." Copies of the FOIA and DHS FOIA regulations are available at www.dhs.gov/foia.

NO FEES

Provisions of FOIA [AND THE PRIVACY ACT] allow DHS to charge for processing fees, up to \$25, unless you seek a waiver of fees. In this instance, because the cost is below the \$25 minimum, there is no charge.

You may contact the FOIA Requester Service Center for the Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), as well as our the Public Liaison, Brendan Henry for any further assistance; to discuss any aspect of your request; to discuss reformulation of your request; and/or to discuss an alternative time frame for the processing of your request at:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

Email: I&AFOIA@HQ.DHS.GOV

Telephone: (202) 282-8826

Refer to **2019-IAFO-00055**

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA dispute resolution services it offers. The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services

National Archives and Records Administration

8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS

College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

¹ For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

Email: ogis@nara.gov
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Toll free: 1-877-684-6448
Fax: 202-741-5769

Please note that contacting any agency official (including the FOIA analyst, FOIA Requester Service Center, FOIA Public Liaison) and/or OGIS **is not** an alternative to filing an administrative appeal and **does not** stop the 90-day appeal clock.

Sincerely,


K. Small
Assistant FOIA Officer

¹ For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).* This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

FIELD ANALYSIS REPORT



(U//FOUO) TTPs Used in Recent US Pipeline Attacks by Suspected Environmental Rights Extremists

2 May 2017



Homeland Security



Iowa Division of Intelligence and Fusion Center



North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center



Montana Analysis and Technical Information Center

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IA-0143-17

(U) **LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE**. The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of MATIC, MNFC, NDSLIC, SDFC, WSFC, STIC, DOI/FC, and DHS and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without MATIC, MNFC, NDSLIC, SDFC, WSFC, STIC, DOI/FC, or DHS authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website on an unclassified network.

(U) **Warning**. This document contains UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may not share this document with critical infrastructure and key resource personnel or private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

(U) This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been highlighted in this document with the label USPER and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures. Other US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at (D) [redacted]@dhs.dhs.gov, (D) [redacted]@dhs.dhs.gov, or (D) [redacted]@dhs.dhs.gov.



Illinois Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center



Washington State Fusion Center



South Dakota Fusion Center



Minnesota Fusion Center

FIELD ANALYSIS REPORT



Regional Analysis with National Perspective.

2 May 2017

(U//FOUO) TTPs Used in Recent US Pipeline Attacks by Suspected Environmental Rights Extremists

(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Montana Analysis and Technical Information Center (MATIC), Minnesota Fusion Center (MNFC), North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center (NDSLIC), South Dakota Fusion Center (SDFC), Washington State Fusion Center (WSFC), the Illinois Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (STIC), and the Iowa Division of Intelligence and Fusion Center (DOI/FC) jointly with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and coordinated with Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

(U) Scope: This Field Analysis Report (FAR) highlights recent criminal disruptions and violent incidents against pipeline projects in the Midwestern and Western United States in 2016, and shows how activities at these events compare with larger environmental rights extremist strategic trends—including those related to targeting, tactics and procedures (TTPs).¹⁷ This product is intended to assist government and law enforcement security partners in identifying, deterring, preventing, and responding to potential threats against pipelines and related entities. It includes a discussion of drivers possibly affecting the future threat of pipeline-related violence from environmental rights extremist violence.

(U) Key Judgments

- (U//FOUO) We assess the October 2016 valve shutoff attacks against five pipelines along the US-Canada border by suspected environmental rights extremists showed a high level of pre-operational planning.
- (U//LES) We assess suspected environmental rights extremists exploited Native American causes in furtherance of their own violent agenda during a campaign to halt construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) in the Midwest and Western United States in 2016.[‡]
- (U//FOUO) We assess that while some characteristics of a series of arsons against Iowa pipeline construction sites in 2016 could be indicative of an environmental rights extremist attack, other factors could reasonably suggest a possible non-ideological motive. This assessment is subject to change if new information emerges. Additionally, environmental rights extremism is a plausible motivation behind multiple attacks against construction equipment in North Dakota during the same period.
- (U//LES) The TTPs observed during the 2016 incidents included but were not limited to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

¹ (U//FOUO) DHS defines **environmental rights extremists** as groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.

† (U//FOUO) DHS defines **terrorism** as any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

[‡] (U) For background information on DAPL, see Appendix A.

§ (U) **Doxing** attacks often include posting on websites targeting individuals' personal background, associates or family, place of employment, home address, or contact information.

- (U//FOUO) We assess environmental rights extremists are likely to use some of these same criminal and violent tactics in attempts to disrupt other energy projects elsewhere in the United States—including those related to pipeline construction—in the coming year.

(U) Significant Incidents in 2016

(U//FOUO) Pipelines and associated construction projects in the Midwestern and Western United States in 2016 were targeted with multiple criminal and violent acts designed to disrupt fossil fuel transportation infrastructure and impede or injure law enforcement. These include valve shutoffs along the northern border, destruction of construction equipment, and arson attacks against Iowa pipeline construction sites.

(U) Valve Shutoffs along Northern Border

(U//FOUO) We assess the October 2016 valve shutoff attacks against five pipelines along the US–Canada border by suspected environmental rights extremists showed a high level of pre-operational planning. Multiple teams—comprised of individuals who traveled from across the United States—conducted simultaneous attacks against remote valve sites, wore disguises, and executed contingency plans.^{7–12} The apparent ease with which these valve shutoff attacks were carried out and the heavy media coverage they attracted lead us to be concerned that other environmental rights extremists could also pursue coordinated attacks against the energy sector. Although these valve attacks did not result in any loss of life, manually shutting pipeline valves carries an inherent risk of death or serious injury if a pipeline ruptures.

- (U//LES) On 11 October 2016, suspected environmental rights extremists shut down five pipelines along the US–Canadian border in Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and Washington for over seven hours, resulting in estimated financial losses in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, according to (D)(3)(A), (D)(3)(B) [REDACTED]^{3–18} Nine individuals were subsequently arrested on charges related to tampering with pipeline valves and preventing the transportation of petroleum. The subjects claimed to have targeted the pipelines to show solidarity with actions against DAPL. They also called on the President to use emergency powers to keep the pipelines closed and requested a total ban on new fossil fuel extractions and an immediate end to use of tar sands and

(U) Environmental Rights Extremists

(U//LES) Environmental rights extremists have a long history of committing violent acts across the United States against entities they perceive are damaging the environment. Since the movement's inception in the 1980s, adherents have been responsible for many criminal acts and threats of violence, such as arson, as well as hundreds of other criminal acts resulting in damages in the tens of millions of dollars to targeted corporations and businesses, including energy and transportation industry targets.^{1,2,†} Motivations for violence tend to mirror those of the larger nonviolent environmentalist movement and include such factors as anger over perceived environmental destruction during the oil-drilling method known as "fracking," perceived environmental and habitat destruction during mining of Canadian tar sands oil that is shipped to the United States via pipelines, and by fears of contamination to water supplies in the event of future pipeline leaks.^{2,3,4} Environmental rights extremists often consider themselves to be nonviolent because their attacks tend to be against property and are intended to only inflict economic damage. However, the use of some tactics—such as shutting off pipeline valves or committing arson to construction equipment used in building pipelines—carry an inherent risk of death or serious injury, regardless of intent. For example, pipelines can rupture as a result of tampering, and fires started by arson can inadvertently spread to non-targeted areas and result in serious injuries. Although some recent and historical environmental rights extremist attacks and disrupted plots have involved use of IEDs, bombing attacks from the movement are uncommon.^{5,6}

* (U//FOUO) DHS recognizes that individuals associated with various groups and movements participated in criminal and violent acts against pipelines in 2016. For the purposes of this paper, these individuals are referred to as environmental rights extremists, as these campaigns were fundamentally about protecting the environment—whether that is opposing oil pipeline construction projects or protecting the indigenous water supply from pollution.

† (U) For other examples of environmental rights extremists attacks against the energy sector, see Appendix B.


coal, according to [redacted] (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) and an [redacted] (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) [redacted]
[redacted] 19,20,*

(U) OBSERVATIONS/TTPS

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)




(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



* (U) For background information on tar sands, see Appendix C.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U) Escalation to Violence at DAPL Occupation in North Dakota

(U//LES) We assess that starting in the summer of 2016, suspected environmental rights extremists exploited Native American anti-DAPL protests to attract new members to their movement, gain public sympathy, and justify their criminal and violent acts.^{39,40} Native American tribes claim the pipeline route crosses sacred sites and burial places, and they are concerned a future pipeline rupture could pollute tribal drinking water.⁴¹ We assess the significant media attention and public sympathy gained by the environmental rights extremists from this new alliance with Native American tribes makes it likely environmental rights extremists will attempt to exploit indigenous causes for their own ideological purposes in future environment-related events.⁴²⁻⁴⁷

- (U//LES) Since August 2016, suspected environmental rights extremists have engaged in multiple violent incidents in North Dakota at illegal encampments on DAPL and US Army Corps of Engineers property in an effort to halt pipeline construction, according to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) [REDACTED]⁴⁸. The occupation, which ended on 24 March 2017, resulted in 761 arrests for various crimes—primarily on charges of criminal trespassing and engaging in a riot with individuals who traveled to the region from California, representing the largest number of arrests at 115, or 15.1 percent, according to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) [REDACTED]^{49,50}. Individuals have engaged in physical assault and threats of physical assault, as well as use of Molotov cocktails and IEDs.

(U) OBSERVATIONS/TPPS:

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)

(U) The Dakota Access Pipeline is sometimes referred to as the Bakken Oil Pipeline.


(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)




(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)




(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE


(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)




(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Page 6 of 18

DHS-19-0018-A-000007

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)

(U) Construction Equipment and Pipelines Targeted in Iowa and the Dakotas

(U//FOUO) We assess that a series of arsons against Iowa pipeline construction sites in 2016 could be indicative of an environmental rights extremist attack—(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

However, other factors—(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

—suggest a non-ideological motive.⁸³ This assessment is subject to change if new information emerges. Additionally, environmental rights extremism is a plausible motivation behind multiple attacks against construction equipment in North Dakota during the same period, as well as a series of attacks puncturing pipelines in Iowa and South Dakota in late February and March 2017.

- (U//LES) On 14 September, employees of a construction company reported an unknown individual(s) used firearms to shoot several rounds of ammunition into a portable toilet and a backhoe at a pipeline construction site near Alexander, North Dakota. According to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) two of the rounds were fired at, but did not penetrate, the backhoe's fuel tank, which could have sparked a fire. There were no injuries, and there have been no arrests or claims of responsibility for the attacks.⁸⁴
- (U//LES) On 13 September, law enforcement arrested individuals for criminal mischief and trespassing after they allegedly sabotaged an under-construction pipeline at a site near New Salem, North Dakota by placing a crate of miscellaneous items in the pipe. According to the (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) had the crate gone undetected, it could have made the pipeline into a "pipe bomb" capable of killing bystanders once a "pig" is run through the pipeline.* The individuals also broke the keys off in the ignition of machinery and spray-painted the messages "WATER IS LIFE," "NO DAPL," and "RISE UP!!! ILLINOIS + IOWA NO DAPL."⁸⁵ The individuals are awaiting trial.

* (U) A "pig" is a device used to check for pipeline leaks.

- (U//LES) On 6 September, an unknown number of individuals damaged electrical wires of construction equipment at an oil pipeline construction site near St. Anthony, North Dakota, creating a threat to worker safety. Additionally, the attackers cut hoses, punctured a tire, filled a radiator with fire extinguisher suppressant, and filled fuel tanks with dirt. There have been no arrests or claims of responsibility for the attacks.⁸⁶
- (U//LES) During the early morning hours of 31 July, 1 August, and 15 October, an unknown individual(s) set fires targeting heavy machinery at three construction sites associated with DAPL in Mahaska and Jasper Counties, Iowa, resulting in over \$3 million in damage.⁸⁷ There have been no arrests or claims of responsibility for the attacks.^{88,89,90,91}
- (U//LES) On 09 November, an unknown number of individuals set fire to four pieces of heavy construction equipment in Buena Vista County, Iowa. According to law enforcement, two additional pieces of equipment were prepped for burning but not set on fire. There have been no claims of responsibility for the attack.⁹²
- (U//LES) Between 24 and 25 September, unidentified environmental extremists sabotaged five pieces of heavy equipment at DAPL site near Winfred, South Dakota. The sabotage included cutting brakes and electrical wiring, causing a potential threat to worker safety. Additionally, dirt was found in the motor, and rocks and gravel were found in swing boxes. Estimated damages are over \$50,000. Two individuals were identified as suspects and provisionally charged with first degree vandalism pending arrest.⁹³

(U) OBSERVATIONS/TTPS:

(b) (3) (A), (b) (8) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7)(E)



(U//FOUO) Outlook: Tactics and Drivers of Pipeline-Related Violence in Near Term

(U//FOUO) We assess environmental rights extremists are likely to use some of these same criminal and violent tactics in attempts to disrupt other US energy projects for the remainder of 2017. Most of these tactics, which are available online for all to see, are relatively easy to carry out have perceived utility among environmental rights extremists in the larger effort to halt DAPL construction.

(U//FOUO) We further assess the following developments, if observed, could lead to an *increased threat* of violence in the coming months from environmental rights extremists against pipeline-related entities in the Midwest and Western United States:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
-
-
-

(U//FOUO) We assess the following developments, if observed, could lead to a *decreased threat* of violence:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
-
-

(U) Intelligence Gaps

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
-
- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
-
- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
-
- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U//FOUO) Comments, requests, or shareable intelligence may be directed to: STIC at 877-455-7842 or STIC@isp.state.il.us; DOI/FC at 515-725-6310 or intca@dps.state.ia.us; MNFC at 651-793-3730 or mn.fc@state.mn.us; MATIC at 406-444-1330 or dojintel@mt.gov; NDSLIC at 701-328-8172 or ndslic@nd.gov; SDFC at 866-466-5263 or sdfusioncenter@state.sd.us; WSFC at 877-843-9522 or intake@wsfc.wa.gov.

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) The information used in this *Far* is drawn from (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

We have

We have

(U//FOUO) We have (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U//LES) We have (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U//FOUO) We have (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U//FOUO) We have (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)


(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U//LES) Tracked by: PIR-IA-CVE.2.2.2; PIR-IA-CVE.2.2.3 DHS-NFCA-2016/17-KIQ-24 HSEC-8.1, HSEC 8.2; HSEC-8.3; HSEC-8.5; HSEC-8.6; HSEC-8.8; HSEC-8.10' HSEC-10.1; HSEC-10.2' HSEC-10.5' HSEC-10.6; HSEC-10.8; HSEC-10.10; IADOIFC-17-IRT1; IADOIFC-17-IRK1; IADOIFC-17-IRV6; MATIC-05.5.2015; MN01.3; MN07.1; ND-HSEC 8.1; ND-HSEC 8.2; ND-HSEC 8.3; ND-HSEC 8.5; ND-HSEC 8.6; ND-HSEC 8.8; ND-HSEC 8.10; ND-HSEC 10.1; ND-HSEC10.2; ND-HSEC 10.5; ND-HSEC 10.6; ND-HSEC 10.8; ND-HSEC 10.10; HSEC-02-02000-P1-SD-2010; HSEC-02-03000-P1-SD-2010; STIC-SIN-8.1; STIC-SIN-12.1; STIC-SIN-12.7; STIC-SIN-12.11; WSFC-1.1I WSFC-1.3.1; WSFC-1.5; WSFC-1.6; WSFC-1.8.1; WSFC-1.8.2; WSFC-1.8.3; WSFC-1.9.5; WSFC-1.10.1.

(U) Appendix A: The Dakota Access Pipeline

(U//LES) The Dakota Access Pipeline project is an underway \$3.78 billion construction project to build a 1,172-mile, 30-inch diameter pipeline for transporting US light sweet crude oil from the Bakken and Three Forks production areas of North Dakota to existing pipelines in Patoka, Illinois for further distribution to refining markets.¹⁰⁴ DAPL construction attracted controversy as a result of a North Dakota-based indigenous tribe's claims that pipeline leaks would contaminate the water supply of their reservation.¹⁰⁵ In July 2016, the tribe filed a lawsuit against the US Army Corps of Engineers for its role in granting permits to build the pipeline.¹⁰⁶ The lawsuit spurred a series of protests and demonstrations near the reservation.¹⁰⁷ Members of other Indian tribes—as well as environmental rights extremists who share the tribes' underlying goal of halting construction of the pipeline—have traveled from across the United States and Canada to join the occupation.^{108,109} Since August 2016, there have been hundreds of arrests for criminal and violent incidents at encampments set up by anti-pipeline groups and nearby DAPL-related sites in an effort to stymie construction efforts.^{110,111}



(U) Appendix B: Prior Energy Sector Attacks by Environmental Rights Extremists

(U//FOUO) The pipeline attacks in the Midwest and Western United States in the latter half of 2016 were the first significant environmental rights extremist attacks targeting the transportation and energy sectors since September 2015. The last known attack specifically targeting a pipeline [REDACTED] (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)


- (U//LES) On 16 September 2015, environmental rights extremist Rory Lynn Gunderman exchanged gunfire with South Dakota law enforcement officers and then fatally shot himself. Subsequently, law enforcement officers located Gunderman's remote campsite in Custer County, South Dakota, where they discovered (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ¹¹³ According to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B), (b) (7) (E) Gunderman purchased numerous IED components in Spearfish, South Dakota on 8 September 2015.¹¹⁴ Analysis of digital media in Gunderman's possession revealed recently accessed copies of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's *Inspire* magazine, including editions 1, 10, and 12.¹¹⁵ Though the exact targets and timing of Gunderman's plot remain unknown, his behavior and statements indicated a fixation on the energy sector.¹¹⁶ Gunderman additionally claimed membership in the Crescent City, California-based Deep Green Resistance^{USPER}. Though the group maintains it only engages in nonviolent activities, the organization promotes the belief that a separate "underground" is needed to conduct violent "direct action" in order to save humanity and other life on earth from environmental disaster. This violent direct action would include attacks against critical infrastructure "to disrupt and dismantle industrial civilization."¹¹⁷

- (U//LES) In September 2014, a suspected environmental rights extremist(s) in Washington stole a bulldozer and drove it into the base of a US Department of Energy 500-kilovolt powerline tower in an apparent attempt to knock the tower down. The incident did not result in any significant damage. Graffiti associated with anti-capitalism and environmental rights extremism was spray-painted at the scene and on nearby structures. Graffiti included the phrase "#killcap" ("Kill Capitalism"), "Corrupt Society," and "ELF," the acronym for the environmental rights extremist movement Earth Liberation Front. The case is currently under investigation.^{118,119}
- (U) From 17 to 18 June 2012, environmental rights extremist Anson Chi^{USPER} set off a series of explosive devices on top of an Atmos^{USPER} gas pipeline in Plano, Texas. Chi intended to damage the pipeline and disrupt natural gas flow. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison without parole on 30 June 2014.^{120,121} Chi pled guilty to a charge of attempting to destroy a natural gas pipeline used in interstate commerce, and to a charge of possessing an explosive device not registered with the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.¹²² Chi also contacted well known convicted bomber Theodore Kaczynski^{USPER} to be a mentor; Kaczynski eventually broke off contact and told Chi to seek professional help.¹²³

(U) Appendix C: Tar Sands


(U) Several pipelines along the US–Canadian border carry crude oil into the United States for refinement and distribution.¹²⁴ Alberta, Canada has one of the world's largest deposits of a particularly thick and heavy form of crude oil known as tar sands oil. Tar sands oil is controversial because of perceived negative impacts to the environment that occur during mining, processing, and transporting the oil—such as large CO₂ emissions contributing to climate change, contamination of groundwater during extraction, and destruction of natural resources used by indigenous tribes.¹²⁵ In October 2016, US environmental rights extremists engaged in coordinated attacks to disrupt five border pipelines perceived to be transporting tar sands oil from Canada into the United States.¹²⁶



(U//FOUO) Appendix D: Behavioral Indicators of Planned Criminal or Violent Activities Targeting Pipelines


(U//FOUO) There are a number of potential behaviors and indicators of planned criminal or violent activities targeting pipelines and associated entities. Some of these behavioral indicators may be constitutionally protected activities and should be supported by additional facts to justify increased suspicions.

• (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)




UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Page 15 of 18

DHS-19-0018-A-000016

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)




UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Page 16 of 18

DHS-19-0018-A-000017

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)




UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Page 17 of 18

DHS-19-0018-A-000018

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)





Product Title: (U//FOUO) TTPs Used in Recent US Pipeline Attacks by Suspected Environmental Rights Extremists

All survey responses are completely anonymous. No personally identifiable information is captured unless you voluntarily offer personal or contact information in any of the comment fields. Additionally, your responses are combined with those of many others and summarized in a report to further protect your anonymity.

1. Please select partner type:	Select One	and function:	Select One
2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive?	Select One		
3. Please complete the following sentence: "I focus most of my time on:"	Select One		
4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:			

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)

<input type="checkbox"/> Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations	<input type="checkbox"/> Initiate a law enforcement investigation
<input type="checkbox"/> Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats	<input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own regional-specific analysis
<input type="checkbox"/> Share with partners	<input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own topic-specific analysis
<input type="checkbox"/> Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel)	<input type="checkbox"/> Develop long-term homeland security strategies
<input type="checkbox"/> Reprioritize organizational focus	<input type="checkbox"/> Do not plan to use
<input type="checkbox"/> Author or adjust policies and guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____

6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product.

7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would?

8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. How did you obtain this product? Select One

10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback? Yes

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name: _____

Position: _____

Organization: _____

State: _____

Contact Number: _____

Email: _____

[Privacy Act Statement](#)

**Submit
Feedback**